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I. INTRODUCTION 
The common thread between all attorney advertisements consists of 
the delicate balance between the professionalism of the practice of law and 
*. Jazlyn Juda will receive her J.D. in May 2017 from Nova Southeastern 
University, Shepard Broad Law Center.  Jazlyn would like to thank the board members and 
her colleagues of the Nova Law Review for all of their hard work and dedication to improve 
and refine this Comment.  She would also like to thank all of her friends and 
familyparticularly her grandmother, Barbara Trump, and mother, Tamberly Judafor their 
infinite love and support.  Jazlyn extends a special thank you to her aunt, Kimberly Juda, for 
helping her to become a better professional woman and teaching her to always “keep her eye 
on the prize.” 
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protected commercial speech under the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.1  Traditionally, solicitation and advertising by lawyers has been 
looked down upon in the practice of law.2  In order to maintain the nobleness 
of the profession, lawyers were expected to build a reputation that would 
attract their business and clientele.3  The prohibition on advertising began as 
a rule of legal etiquette and not rules of ethics, as advertising regulations are 
modernly viewed.4  Lawyers treated the legal profession more as a public 
service rather than as a trade or means of earning a living.5  It was believed 
that commercializing legal services would lower the nobleness and honor of 
the profession.6 
Over time, these strong views against attorney advertisements 
evolved into a standard for rules of ethics.7  The Canons of Professional 
Ethics, drafted in 1908 by the American Bar Association (“ABA”), entirely 
prohibited attorney advertising and solicitation, claiming advertising and 
solicitation by lawyers was unprofessional.8  Later in 1969, the ABA drafted 
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“ABA Model Code”), which 
was adopted by every state in the nation and followed the Canons model of 
prohibiting all forms of attorney advertisements.9  After the Supreme Court 
of the United States decided in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona10 that attorney 
advertisements were classified as commercial speech and thus protected 
under the First Amendment, the ABA was left to change the standards of 
attorney advertisements in order to reflect this landmark decision and to 
uphold First Amendment protection of attorney advertisements.11  As a result 
of this decision, the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“ABA 
Model Rules”) were drafted and later approved by the ABA in 1983, 
allowing attorney advertisements, but strongly prohibiting in-person 
																																																								
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 210–12 
(1953). 
2. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12. 
3. Veronica Wooten Brace, Limits on Marketing of Attorney Services, 8 U. 
FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 109, 110 (1996). 
4. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977); Brace, supra note 3, 
at 110. 
5. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210; Brace, supra note 3, at 110. 
6. DRINKER, supra note 1, at 211–12. 
7. See Brace, supra note 3, at 110. 
8. CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908); Brace, supra 
note 3, at 110–11. 
9. MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)–(B) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 1975); Brace, supra note 3, at 111. 
10. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). 
11. Id. at 383–84; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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solicitation by lawyers.12  The ABA Model Rules have since served as the 
model for professional lawyering codes for sixty-five percent of the states, 
leaving the majority of the states to permit various forms of attorney 
advertisements.13  Throughout the history of the legal profession, in response 
to constitutional challenges and decisions of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, the ABA has amended both ABA Model Code and ABA Model 
Rules, permitting attorney advertising but still retaining a heavy grip in 
regulating advertising as much as the Constitution and the Supreme Court of 
the United States has allowed.14 
The delicate balance between the honor and nobleness of the legal 
profession and the First Amendment’s protection of commercial speech is 
critical in the case of a Florida law firm that is challenging The Florida Bar’s 
Standing Committee on Advertising for denying the firm’s proposed plan to 
send automated text messages in hopes of obtaining potential clients.15  The 
law firm’s plan consists of obtaining “a daily list provided by the . . . county 
clerk of court to [retrieve] phone numbers of [people who had been] arrested 
the previous day.”16  The law firm would then use these contacts to send 
automated text messages advertising the firm’s legal services to these listed 
individuals.17  The text messages would provide an opt out option for the 
recipients to choose to not receive any future communications from the 
firm.18  The Committee found that the firm’s proposal of automated text 
messages is considered direct solicitation and is thus prohibited by Rule 4-
7.18(a) of The Florida Bar’s Rules of Professional Conduct, 19  which 
involves direct contact with prospective clients.20  The law firm countered 
the Committee’s response by claiming that text messages are not similar to 
direct telephone communications, and that due to modern habits and modern 
																																																								
12. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983); 
Brace, supra note 3, at 111 n.19. 
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983); Brace, supra note 3, 
at 111. 
14. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; Brace, supra note 3, at 111; see also MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (1983 & 2013); MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY 
DR 2-101 (1975). 
15. Nathan Hale, Fla. Bar Rejects Firm’s Plan to Send Ads Via Text 
Messages, LAW360 (May 22, 2015, 6:32 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/659251/fla-
bar-rejects-firm-s-plan-to-send-ads-via-text-messages; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. 
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); 
DRINKER, supra note 1, at 210–12. 
16. Hale, supra note 15. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. 
19. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014). 
20. Id. r. 4-7.18 (2014); Hale, supra note 15. 
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modes of communication, text messages serve the same purpose as email or 
direct mail.21 
This Comment will focus on commercial speech, the rights of 
lawyers to advertise legal services, and the regulations that The Florida Bar 
has placed on attorney advertisements.22  This Comment will also discuss 
why Florida’s regulations on attorney advertisements are neither consistent 
with the Supreme Court of the United States’ decisions, nor take into 
consideration modern modes of communication utilized in today’s society.23  
Part II of this Comment will examine regulations on attorney advertisements 
on a national level and discuss the Supreme Court of the United States’ 
decisions regarding commercial speech and protection of attorney 
advertisements and solicitations under the First Amendment, as well as the 
ABA’s rules on attorney solicitation and advertising. 24   Part III of this 
Comment will explain the various modes of attorney advertisements, 
including direct and indirect solicitation of potential clients and targeted 
letters to potential clients.25  Part IV of this Comment will introduce the State 
of Florida’s rules regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations and 
compare Florida’s rules to the ABA’s rules regarding attorney 
advertisements.26  This Comment will then analyze attorney advertisements 
via text messages in Part V and explain how text messages are indirect 
modes of advertising and why Florida should consider modern modes of 
communication in regulating attorney advertisements. 27   Ultimately, this 
Comment will conclude that text messages can be considered direct 
communications, which are protected forms of commercial speech that 
should not be restricted by The Florida Bar.28 
II. A NATIONAL LOOK AT ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS:  THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
A. Opening the Door to Protection of Attorney Advertisements 
Commercial speech was first recognized as protected speech under 
the First Amendment in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia 
																																																								
21. Hale, supra note 15. 
22. See infra Part II–IV. 
23. See infra Part IV–V. 
24. See infra Part II. 
25. See infra Part III. 
26. See infra Part IV. 
27. See infra Part V. 
28. See infra Part VI. 
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Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.29  In this case, the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that commercial speech is entitled to protection under the 
First Amendment, even if the speech is purely economic or the speaker’s 
motive of the speech is to receive pecuniary gain. 30   The appellees, 
consumers of prescription drugs, brought suit against the Virginia State 
Board of Pharmacy challenging the validity of a Virginia statute under the 
First Amendment.31  The state statute prohibited pharmacists to advertise 
prices of prescription drugs.32  The Court explained that commercial speech 
was of general public interest and served as a benefit to society, providing 
consumers with the knowledge and availability of goods and services.33  It 
was further held that a state’s interest in protecting and upholding the 
professionalism of the field might not be sufficient enough to maintain the 
prohibition of an advertisement. 34   Ultimately, the Court extended First 
Amendment protection to commercial speech and concluded that although a 
state is free to regulate commercial speech, a state may not place a complete 
ban on advertisements or commercial speech and keep the knowledge of the 
availability of goods and services away from consumers.35 
The protected First Amendment right to commercial speech was 
extended to attorney advertisements in the case of Bates.36  This was the first 
case subsequent to Virginia State Board of Pharmacy to weigh the rights of 
attorneys to advertise against the ABA Model Rules and state bar rules in the 
light of commercial speech and First Amendment protection.37 
In this case, the appellants were two licensed attorneys in the State of 
Arizona who in order to generate business, placed an advertisement in a local 
newspaper advertising legal services and the prices of the services offered by 
																																																								
29. 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
30. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762; see also U.S. CONST. amend. 
I. 
31. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50, 753–54; see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
32. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 749–50. 
33. Id. at 764–65. 
34. Id. at 766, 770. 
The challenge now made, however, is based on the First Amendment.  This casts 
the [b]oard’s justifications in a different light, for on close inspection it is seen that 
the [s]tate’s protectiveness of its citizens rests in large measure on the advantages 
of their being kept in ignorance.  The advertising ban does not directly affect 
professional standards one way or the other. 
Id. at 769. 
35. Id. at 770; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
36. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); see also U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
37. Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773; MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) 
(AM. BAR ASS’N 1970). 
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the firm.38  The Arizona State Bar claimed that the firm’s use of a newspaper 
advertisement to generate business violated Disciplinary Rule 2-101(B) 
incorporated by the Supreme Court of Arizona that read: 
A lawyer shall not publicize himself, or his partner, or associate, or 
any other lawyer affiliated with him or his firm, as a lawyer 
through newspaper or magazine advertisements, radio or television 
announcements, display advertisements in the city or telephone 
directories or other means of commercial publicity, nor shall he 
authorize or permit others to do so in his behalf.39 
A hearing was held before the Special Local Administrative 
Committee, which decided that the appellants should be suspended from 
practicing law for a period of six months.40  The appellants challenged the 
Committee’s decision as a violation of their First Amendment rights. 41  
Focusing on their previous decision and precedent set by Virginia Board of 
Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of the United States determined that the same 
First Amendment protection of commercial speech was applicable to 
attorney advertisements of legal services and fees.42  The Court explained 
that even if a speaker’s intent in making the speech is purely economic, such 
speech is protected in certain contexts.43   Stressing the societal interests 
served by commercial speech, the Court discussed how commercial speech 
informs the public of the availability, prices, nature of products and services, 
and assures “informed and reliable decision-making.”44  Since the decision of 
the Court in Bates, attorney advertisements are not subject to complete 
prohibition or suppression; however, states retain a right to regulate attorney 
advertisements.45 
B. How Far Can Regulation of Attorney Advertisements Go? 
Both landmark decisions of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and 
Bates determined that commercial speech was protected under the First 
Amendment; however, both cases held that states retained the right to 
																																																								
38. Bates, 433 U.S. at 353–54. 
39. Id. at 355; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(B) 
(1970). 
40. Bates, 433 U.S. at 356. 
41. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
42. Bates, 433 U.S. at 357; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 773. 
43. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364. 
44. Id. 
45. Id. at 383–84. 
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regulate commercial speech under certain contexts.46  These two Supreme 
Court of the United States’ decisions determine that commercial speech is 
protected under the First Amendment but retains lesser protection than other 
constitutionally protected forms of speech.47  Despite the lessened protection 
that commercial speech is granted under the First Amendment, commercial 
speech is still protected from unwarranted governmental regulation.48  Both 
cases are influential decisions in regard to protection of commercial speech 
under the First Amendment; however, neither of these decisions discussed to 
what extent commercial speech could be regulated by the government or by 
the states.49 
Following Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the Supreme Court of 
the United States set a standard consisting of a four-prong analysis for what 
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of how far the government or 
states may regulate commercial speech.50  In Central Hudson Gas & Electric 
Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York,51 the Supreme Court was 
presented with the question of whether a regulation from the Public Service 
Commission of New York completely banning promotional advertising of an 
electrical utility company violated the First Amendment. 52   The Court 
defined commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic 
interests of the speaker and its audience.”53  For commercial speech to be 
protected under the First Amendment, the speech must concern lawful 
activity and may not be misleading.54  If the speech is concerning lawful 
activity and is not misleading, the speech falls within First Amendment 
protection. 55   The Court determined that in order to restrict commercial 
speech, the asserted governmental interest to be served by the restriction on 
commercial speech must be substantial. 56   If the asserted governmental 
interest to be served is substantial, it must be “determine[d] whether the 
																																																								
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363, 384; Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770–72. 
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. 
Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562–63 (1980); Bates, 433 U.S. at 357, 363; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761, 770. 
48. Bates, 433 U.S. at 363; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
49. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770; see 
also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
50. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 748. 
51. 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
52. Id. at 558; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
53. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 561. 
54. Id. at 564; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
55. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564; see also U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
56. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
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regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether 
[the regulation] is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest.”57  Taken together, this analysis is known as the Central Hudson 
test. 58   Based on the Central Hudson test, in determining whether 
commercial speech is guaranteed First Amendment protection and whether 
the government or state has the ability to restrict the commercial speech, the 
protection of the speech looks at the nature of the expression and nature of 
the governmental interest served by the regulation imposed.59  Regulations of 
commercial speech are measured under an intermediate scrutiny analysis.60  
A state’s restrictions on commercial speech “must be substantially related to 
the achievement of an important [state] objective.”61 
The Court in Central Hudson held that in order to determine whether 
the restriction on commercial speech is in proportion to the government or 
state interest, the restriction must directly advance the government or state 
interest involved, and if the government or state interest could be served by a 
more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restriction will 
not meet First Amendment muster.62  In other words, the restriction imposed 
may only extend as far as the interest that it serves.63  Similar to Virginia 
State Board of Pharmacy and Bates, the Court in Central Hudson held that a 
ban on advertising could not survive if the ban is imposed to protect ethical 
or professional standards of a profession.64  The Court concluded, as stated in 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, “‘[t]he advertising ban does not directly 
affect [the] professional standards [of a profession] one way or the other.’”65  
																																																								
57. Id. 
58. Id. 
In commercial speech cases, then, a fourpart analysis has developed.  At the 
outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First 
Amendment.  For commercial speech to come within that provision, it at least must 
concern lawful activity and not be misleading.  Next, we ask whether the asserted 
governmental interest is substantial.  If both inquiries yield positive answers, we 
must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest 
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest. 
Id. 
59. Id. at 563; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
60. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623 (1995). 
61. Intermediate Scrutiny, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
62. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 
564. 
63. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564. 
64. Id.; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 378, 383 (1977); Va. State 
Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
65. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 564 (quoting Va. State Bd. 
of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 769) (alteration in original). 
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The Court found that the state’s interest in upholding professionalism is not a 
substantial interest in regulating commercial speech.66 
In 1982, the Court took the Central Hudson test and analyzed it from 
the perspective of attorney advertisements in the case of In re R.M.J. 67  
Comparing this Supreme Court decision to Bates, In re R.M.J. was the first 
case subsequent to Central Hudson to apply the four-prong analysis of what 
constitutes commercial speech and the extent of regulation permitted on 
attorney advertisements.68  The Court in In re R.M.J. emphasized the holding 
of Bates, where the Court held that commercial speech protection under the 
First Amendment extended to attorney advertisements and “‘advertising by 
attorneys may not be subjected to blanket suppression.’”69  The Court found 
in Bates that the advertising of prices for legal services offered was neither 
advertising unlawful activity nor a misleading advertisement, preventing the 
speech from being prohibited on that basis. 70   The Court in Bates also 
rejected suppression of an attorney advertisement based on the state interest 
that attorney advertisements had negative effects on the profession.71 
The Court in In re R.M.J. found that although Bates was a critical 
case in analyzing the extent of protection of attorney advertisements under 
the First Amendment, the decision in Bates was a narrow decision in holding 
that attorney advertisements could still be regulated by states.72  The Court 
found that “[f]alse, deceptive, or misleading advertising remains subject to 
restraint, and . . . advertising by the professions poses special risks of 
deception, ‘because the public lacks sophistication concerning legal services, 
misstatements that might be overlooked or deemed unimportant in other 
advertising may be found quite inappropriate in legal advertising.’”73  In 
regards to attorney advertisements, the Court in Bates did not set any 
standards or regulations “on potentially or demonstrably misleading 
advertis[ements].”74  However, in circumstances subsequent to Bates, the 
Court reasoned that regulation and prohibition of advertisements are 
permissible where the advertisements are likely to be misleading.75  The 
																																																								
66. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 571–72. 
67. 455 U.S. 191, 203, 206 (1982). 
68. Id.; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566; Bates, 433 U.S. at 
383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
69. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 199 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383); see also 
U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
70. Bates, 433 U.S. at 382–83. 
71. Id. at 368–69, 371. 
72. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Bates, 433 
U.S. at 383. 
73. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 200 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 383). 
74. Id. at 202. 
75. Id. 
9
Juda: Just Shoot Me A Text: The Florida Bar's Regulations On Attorney A
Published by NSUWorks, 2017
162 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40 
Court in In re R.M.J. set the official standard for the commercial speech 
doctrine in the context of advertising for professional services as follows: 
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the 
protections of the First Amendment.  But when the particular 
content or method of the advertising suggests that it is inherently 
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such 
advertising is subject to abuse, the [s]tate[] may impose 
appropriate restrictions.  Misleading advertising may be prohibited 
entirely.  But the [s]tates may not place an absolute prohibition on 
certain types of potentially misleading information . . . if the 
information also may be presented in a way that is not deceptive.76 
Even though a state holds the ability to regulate non-misleading 
commercial speech, “the [s]tate must [still] assert a substantial interest, and 
the interference with the speech must be in proportion to the interest 
served.”77  Regulations on commercial speech and professional advertising 
“must be narrowly drawn, and the [s]tate lawfully may regulate only to the 
extent regulation furthers the [s]tate’s substantial interest.”78 
While Central Hudson established a four-pronged analysis as to 
what constitutes commercial speech and the extent that the government may 
regulate commercial speech, the Central Hudson test focused on commercial 
speech in a general context.79  The Court in In re R.M.J. took the four-
pronged analysis of Central Hudson and applied it to professional 
advertising.80  The four-pronged analysis of Central Hudson is used by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in determining whether certain contexts 
of commercial speech are protected under the First Amendment, and the 
extent to which such speech may be regulated by the states.81 
C. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
The ABA is a professional organization of lawyers and law students 
from all over the nation.82  The ABA was founded in 1878 and has since 
expanded to four hundred thousand members, committed to:  “[S]erving . . . 
																																																								
76. Id. at 203. 
77. Id. 
78. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. 
79. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 
557, 564–66 (1980). 
80. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203–04; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 
U.S. at 566. 
81. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
82. See About the American Bar Association, A.B.A., 
http://www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html (last visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
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members, improving the legal profession, eliminating bias . . . and advancing 
the rule of law throughout the United States and around the world.”83  The 
ABA aims to uphold the legal profession and provide practical tools and 
resources for lawyers.84 
One of the roles of the ABA is to establish model ethical codes, 
which the majority of states in the nation have adopted as a part of their own 
ethical standards.85  The current ethical rules established by the ABA are the 
ABA Model Rules.86  The ABA Model Rules “were adopted by the ABA 
House of Delegates in 1983 [and] [s]erve as models for the ethical rules of 
most states.”87  California is the only state that does not model their ethical 
and professional rules for lawyers after the ABA Model Rules.88  The current 
ABA Model Rules set ethical and professional standards for lawyers across 
the nation in regard to the client-lawyer relationship, acting as a counselor, 
acting as an advocate, transactions with persons other than clients, law firms 
and associations, public service, information about legal services, and 
maintaining the integrity of the profession.89 
The ABA standards regarding attorney advertising and solicitation 
are found in Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules.90  The general 
rule of attorney advertising is found in Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules and 
reads “[s]ubject to the requirements of Rules 7.1 and 7.3, a lawyer may 
advertise services through written, recorded or electronic communication, 
including public media.”91  The ABA and ABA Model Rules follow the 
precedent by Bates, recognizing that attorney advertisements serve a 
fundamental benefit to the consumers in need of legal services.92  The ABA 
states: 
To assist the public in learning and obtaining legal services, 
lawyers should be allowed to make known their services not only 
through reputation but also through organized information 
campaigns in the form of advertising.  Advertising involves an 
active quest for clients, contrary to the tradition that a lawyer 
																																																								
83. Id. 
84. Id. 
85. Id.; About the Model Rules, A.B.A., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/
professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct.html (last 
visited Dec. 18, 2015). 
86. See About the Model Rules, supra note 85. 
87. Id.; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013). 
88. About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also CAL. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT (2015). 
89. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT (2013). 
90. Id. r. 7.2–.3. 
91. Id. r. 7.2. 
92. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376 (1977). 
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should not seek clientele.  However, the public’s need to know 
about legal services can be fulfilled in part through advertising . . . 
.  The interest in expanding public information about legal services 
ought to prevail over considerations of tradition.  Nevertheless, 
advertising by lawyers entails the risk of practices that are 
misleading or overreaching.93 
The modern ABA Model Rules completely overturned the ABA’s 
1969 ABA Model Code and the 1908 Canons of Professional Ethicsboth 
of which defined the traditional view of attorney advertising as 
unprofessional and placed complete bans on attorney advertisements.94  After 
the ABA Model Rules were adopted in 1983, attorney advertisements were 
recognized as protected commercial speech under the First Amendment, and 
ethical attorney advertisements came as a result of the Supreme Court of the 
United States decisions in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, Bates, and In 
re R.M.J.95 
The ABA Model Rules discuss the rules of attorney solicitation in 
Rule 7.3: 
A lawyer shall not by in-person, live telephone, or real-time 
electronic contact solicit professional employment when a 
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s 
pecuniary gain, unless the person contacted:  (1) is a lawyer; or (2) 
has a family, close personal, or prior professional relationship with 
the lawyer.  A lawyer shall not solicit professional employment by 
written, recorded, or electronic communication or by in-person, 
telephone or real-time electronic contact even when not otherwise 
prohibited by paragraph (a), if:  (1) the target of the solicitation has 
[been] made known to the lawyer a desire not to be solicited by the 
lawyer; or (2) the solicitation involves coercion, duress, or 
harassment.96 
The distinction that the ABA Model Rules make between the rules 
regarding attorney advertising and attorney solicitation involves the use of 
real-time or live communications to a specific audience.97  The ABA defines 
																																																								
93. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 cmt. (2013). 
94. About the Model Rules, supra note 85; see also MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 2 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1975); CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 27 (Am. 
Bar Ass’n 1908). 
95. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 199–200 (1982); Bates, 433 U.S. at 383–84; 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770, 773 
(1976); see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
96. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013). 
97. See id. r. 7.2 (ABA professional rules of attorney advertisements); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 (2013) (ABA professional rules of attorney solicitations). 
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solicitation as “a targeted communication initiated by the lawyer that is 
directed to a specific person and . . . offers to provide, or can reasonably be 
understood as offering to provide, legal services.”98  A communication to the 
general public is not considered solicitation by the ABA.99  The ABA Model 
Rules express concern for potential abuse through solicitation of direct in-
person or live communication by a lawyer to a potential client.100  According 
to the ABA Model Rules, “[the] potential for abuse inherent in direct in-
person, live telephone, or real-time electronic solicitation justifies its 
prohibition, particularly since lawyers have alternative means of conveying 
necessary information to those who may be in need of legal services.”101  The 
ABA Model Rules explain that communications with potential clients can be 
sent through other electronic modes of communication that are not 
considered to be real-time or live communications, such as e-mail or other 
electronic modes of communication.102  The ABA’s goal in prohibiting direct 
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is to prevent a potential client 
from hiring an attorney based on undue influence, intimidation, or pressure 
under the circumstances.103 
The ABA has a substantial interest in prohibiting direct, in-person 
solicitation to protect the consumer of legal services; however, targeted or 
direct solicitation may benefit the consumer or potential client, as well as the 
attorney.104  In an article published by the ABA Journal in 2013, Stephanie 
Francis Ward discussed how consistently targeting advertisements to a 
specific audience may benefit a legal practice. 105   Ward countered the 
traditional belief that lawyers should attract their business clientele through 
good work and not through advertisements,106 by stating, “[s]ome lawyers 
believe that if you do good work, people will automatically come to you.  
They are wrong.  People need reminders.”107  Ward stressed the ABA’s 
promotion of direct advertisements by referring to the fact that personal 
injury lawyers often send targeted advertisements and letters to accident 
																																																								
98. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3 cmt. (2013). 
99. Id. 
100. Id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 462 (1978); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3. cmt (2013). 
104. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
7.3 cmt (2013). 
105. Stephanie Francis Ward, 50 Simple Ways You Can Market Your Practice, 
A.B.A. J. (July 1, 2013, 10:19 AM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/50_simple_
ways_you_can_market_your_practice. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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victims, and criminal defense lawyers often refer to arrest reports in hopes of 
targeting and obtaining potential clients. 108   This practice of targeted 
advertisements benefits both the consumers who are in need of legal services 
and who may not know how to go about obtaining legal representation and 
the attorneys who are in need of business and clientele.109 
III. PROTECTED FORMS OF ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS 
Looking at the ABA Model Rules and at the ethical and professional 
rules of the states that are modeled after the ABA Model Rules, there are 
many permissible forms of attorney advertisements and solicitation through 
written or electronic communications. 110   Two forms of attorney 
advertisements that result in a gap between the standards for attorney 
advertisements of the ABA and state ethical and professional rules are 
indirect and direct solicitation, specifically targeted letters to potential 
clients.111 
A. Direct Solicitation v. Indirect Solicitation 
In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n,112 the Supreme Court of the 
United States held that “the [s]tate—or the Bar acting with state 
authorization—constitutionally may discipline a lawyer for soliciting clients 
in person, for pecuniary gain, under circumstances likely to pose dangers that 
the [s]tate has a right to prevent.”113  In this case, the appellant, a practicing 
lawyer, learned of a young girl who was a driver in a recent car accident.114  
The appellant visited the young accident victim in the hospital, where he told 
the accident victim that he would represent her, and subsequently, the 
accident victim signed an agreement retaining the appellant’s legal 
representation and agreed that the appellant would receive one-third of the 
victim’s recovery.115 
After obtaining the signed retainer agreement with the accident 
victim, the appellant contacted the passenger of the vehicle that the victim 
was driving and informed the passenger that she had a chance of recovery 
																																																								
108. Id. 
109. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 376–77 (1977). 
110. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a), 7.3(a)–(b) (AM. BAR 
ASS’N 2013); About the Model Rules, supra note 85. 
111. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a)–(b) (2013). 
112. 436 U.S. 447 (1978). 
113. Id. at 449. 
114. Id. 
115. Id. at 450. 
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against the driver and persuaded her to sign a contingent fee agreement.116  
When the passenger of the vehicle decided she did not want to sue the driver 
and attempted to revoke her agreement with the appellant, the appellant 
claimed that the agreement was binding and could not be revoked.117  The 
driver of the vehicle also attempted to revoke her agreement with the 
appellant.118  Both the driver and passenger of the vehicle brought complaints 
against the appellant with the Grievance Committee of the Geauga County 
Bar Association.119  These complaints were later referred to the Board of 
Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 
who determined that the appellant violated the Ohio Code of Professional 
Responsibility, and appellant argued that it was his First Amendment right to 
solicit his legal services to potential clients.120 
In Ohralik, the Court stated that “[t]he solicitation of business by a 
lawyer through direct, in-person communication with [a] prospective client 
has long been viewed as inconsistent with the profession’s ideal of the 
attorney-client relationship and as posing a significant potential for harm to 
the prospective client.”121  The Court determined that a state has a stronger 
interest in heavily regulating direct in-person solicitation than in regulating 
indirect attorney advertisements made towards the public.122  In-person direct 
solicitation by attorneys of potential clients is still considered to be 
commercial speech and thus protected under the First Amendment; however, 
in-person direct solicitation receives a lower level of judicial scrutiny.123  The 
Court distinguished the in-person solicitation used by the appellant in 
Ohralik from the indirect advertising at issue in Bates, in that in-person 
solicitation may discourage potential clients in need of legal representation 
and “may disservice the individual and societal interest, identified in Bates, 
in facilitating ‘informed and reliable decision-making.’”124  The Court also 
recognized a significant difference between in-person direct solicitation and 
indirect advertisements in that “[u]nlike a public advertisement, which 
simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act upon it or 
not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often demands an 
immediate response, without providing an opportunity for comparison or 
																																																								
116. Id. at 449, 451. 
117. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 452. 
118. Id. 
119. Id. 
120. Id. at 452–53; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
121. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 454. 
122. Id. at 457–58. 
123. Id. at 457; see also U.S. CONST. amend. 1. 
124. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 
350, 364 (1974). 
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reflection.”125  In-person solicitation—because of the intimidation and undue 
influence that it has the potential to cause—does not stand up to the 
precedent set forth by the Court in Virginia Board of Pharmacy and Bates, in 
holding that commercial speech, specifically attorney advertisements, serve 
the fundamental function of informing the public of the availability and 
nature of goods and services and promote rational decision-making.126 
The Court in Ohralik, held that a state has a substantial interest in 
regulating in-person direct solicitation by attorneys to potential clients, 
because “the potential for overreaching is significantly greater when a 
lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an 
unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”127  It was decided by the 
Court that a state has reason to believe that in-person solicitation may be 
harmful to the person who is solicited, and thus, the state has an interest in 
protecting its people from this harm.128  The Court held that being officers of 
the courts, attorneys serve the role of administering justice and a state has an 
interest in regulating attorneys and the standards of the legal profession, 
including setting forth standards regarding attorney advertisements.129 
The Supreme Court of the United States set fundamental precedent 
regarding direct and indirect solicitation and attorney advertisements in 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.130  
In this case the appellant was a practicing attorney who in hopes of 
expanding his practice, ran advertisements for his law firm in a local 
newspaper.131  The appellant targeted defendants of drunk driving cases.132  
When the Ohio Office of Disciplinary Counsel saw the appellant’s 
newspaper advertisement, the appellant was informed that his advertisement 
violated the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, which prohibited 
offering representation to criminal defendants on a contingent-fee basis.133  
Appellant then withdrew the advertisement.134  One year later, the appellant 
ran another newspaper advertisement targeting women who had suffered 
injuries from the use of a particular contraceptive device.135  As with the 
																																																								
125. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
126. See id. at 457, 466–67; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; Va. State Bd. of 
Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 764–65 (1976). 
127. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 464–65. 
128. Id. at 466. 
129. Id. at 460. 
130. 471 U.S. 626, 641–42, 645–47 (1985). 
131. Id. at 629–30. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. at 630; see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106(C) 
(1970). 
134. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 630. 
135. Id. at 630–31. 
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targeted drunk driving advertisements previously posted by the appellant, 
this advertisement attracted the attention of the Ohio Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel.136  The appellant was charged with violating several disciplinary 
rules of the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility, including that the 
targeted drunk driving advertisement was “‘false, fraudulent, . . . and 
deceptive to the public’ because it offered representation on a contingent-fee 
basis in a criminal case” and the advertisement targeted toward injured 
women was not dignified and violated the state rule that “[a] lawyer who has 
given unsolicited advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take 
legal action shall not accept employment resulting from that advice.”137  In its 
opinion, the Court stressed that because the appellant was proposing a 
commercial transaction, the appellant’s speech was commercial and fell 
within the boundaries of First Amendment protection.138  The question for 
the Court then was the extent that the use of direct advertisements may be 
regulated.139  Throughout its holding, the Court kept in mind that complete 
prohibition or “blanket bans on price advertising by attorneys and rules 
preventing attorneys from using non-deceptive terminology to describe their 
fields of practice are impermissible.” 140   The Court also kept in mind 
throughout its holding, that in regards to rules prohibiting in-person 
solicitation, there are some circumstances where rules prohibiting in-person 
solicitation of potential clients by attorneys may be permissible. 141  
Differentiating the use of in-person solicitation by the appellant in Ohralik, 
with the use of newspaper advertisements by the appellant in Zauderer, the 
Court determined that the use of newspaper advertisements, though directed 
toward a specific audience, did not invade the privacy of those individuals 
who read the newspaper and saw the advertisement for legal services.142  The 
Court further discussed that print advertisements do not have the same high 
risk of overreaching or undue influence that in-person solicitation has.143  
The Court stated: 
Print advertising may convey information and ideas more or less 
effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the 
																																																								
136. Id. at 631. 
137. Id. at 631–33 (footnote omitted); see also OHIO CODE OF PROF’L 
RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-101(A)(1), 104(A), 106(C) (1970). 
138. U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 637–38; see also Ohralik v. 
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978) (holding that commercial speech includes 
any speech that proposes a commercial transaction). 
139. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 629. 
140. Id. at 638. 
141. Id.; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457–58. 
142. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
143. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642. 
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personal presence of a trained advocate.  In addition, a printed 
advertisement, unlike a personal encounter initiated by an attorney, 
is not likely to involve pressure on the potential client for an 
immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.144 
An indirect advertisement, although aimed toward a specific 
audience, allows a potential client to reflect on the need and ability of hiring 
a particular lawyer and to freely make the choice of hiring a particular 
attorney, without undue influence or added pressure of in-person 
solicitation.145  In the case of Ohralik, the state had a substantial interest in 
regulating in-person solicitation of potential clients by attorneys in order to 
protect its citizens from undue influence or intimidation. 146   The Court 
determined that this substantial state interest could not stand to regulate the 
use of indirect solicitation of potential clients by attorneys, because indirect 
advertisements do not carry the same risk of undue influence that in-person 
solicitations carry.147 
B. Targeted Letters to Potential Clients 
In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 148  the Supreme Court of the 
United States was faced with the issue of “whether a [s]tate may . . . prohibit 
lawyers from soliciting [and advertising] legal business for pecuniary gain by 
sending truthful and non-deceptive letters to potential clients known to face 
particular legal problems.”149  The petitioner was a practicing attorney who 
filed for approval by the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission of a 
letter that he had hopes of sending “‘to potential clients who . . . had a 
foreclosure suit filed against them.’”150  “The Commission did not find the 
letter [to be] false or misleading,” however, the Commission did find that the 
letter violated a “Kentucky Supreme Court Rule [that] prohibited the mailing 
or delivery of written advertisements ‘precipitated by a specific event or 
occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct 
from the general public.’”151  The Commission then urged the Supreme Court 
of Kentucky to amend its rules after finding that the rule “ban[ning] . . . 
																																																								
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 462, 466 (holding that a state has reason to 
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the 
person who is solicited). 
147. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642. 
148. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). 
149. Id. at 468. 
150. Id. at 469. 
151. Id. at 469–70. 
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targeted, direct mail advertise[ments] violated the First Amendment.”152  The 
petitioner then petitioned the Kentucky Bar Association’s Committee on 
Legal Ethics for an advisory opinion on the validity of the rule, which 
resulted in the Committee on Legal Ethics’ adoption of the ABA’s Rule 7.3 
on attorney solicitation.153 
In analyzing targeted direct solicitation by attorneys to potential 
clients, the Court reiterated its fundamental holding in Zauderer that “[t]he 
‘unique features of in-person solicitation by lawyers [that] justified a 
prophylactic rule prohibiting lawyers from engaging in such solicitation for 
pecuniary gain,’ . . . are not present in the context of written 
advertisements.”154  The Court pointed out that previous precedent set by the 
Court in regards to attorney advertisements never distinguished between the 
constitutionality and protection of various modes of written advertisements 
to the general public.155  The Court made the analysis based upon the four 
prong analysis of Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.156  The Court here 
distinguishes between advertisements that target specific individuals and 
read “[i]t has come to my attention that your home is being foreclosed on” 
and advertisements that more broadly read “[i]s your home being foreclosed 
on?” 157  The Court determined that the advertisement not targeting specific 
individuals is commercial speech that can be regulated or prohibited. 158  
Whereas, the more broad advertisement could not be prohibited without 
violating the First Amendment as long as the advertisement was not false, 
misleading, or advertising unlawful activity.159 
The Supreme Court of Kentucky, the preceding court below the 
Supreme Court of the United States, had relied on the holding of Ohralik and 
found that the state’s complete prohibition on all targeted, direct mail 
solicitation was permissible under the First Amendment, because of the 
“serious potential for abuse inherent in direct solicitation by lawyers of 
potential clients known to need specific legal services.”160  The Supreme 
Court of the United States in its holding did not agree that the precedent set 
																																																								
152. Id. at 470; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
153. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470; see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 
7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
154. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472 (alteration in original) (quoting Zauderer v. 
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641 (1985)). 
155. Id. at 473. 
156. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 472; Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. 
Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
157. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473. 
158. Id. at 472–73. 
159. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473, 479. 
160. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978). 
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by Ohralikthat direct in-person solicitation by attorneys of potential 
clientswas present in the case of Shapero regarding targeted, direct mail 
solicitation.161  The Court made a fundamental distinction between direct and 
indirect solicitation.162  The Court stated: 
Of course, a particular potential client will feel equally 
overwhelmed by his legal troubles and will have the same 
impaired capacity for good judgment regardless of whether a 
lawyer mails him an untargeted letter or exposes him to a 
newspaper advertisement—concededly constitutionally protected 
activities—or instead mails a targeted letter.  The relevant inquiry 
is not whether there exist potential clients whose condition makes 
them susceptible to undue influence, but whether the mode of 
communication poses a serious danger that lawyers will exploit 
any such susceptibility.163 
The Court found that it is not to whom the targeted solicitation is 
sent that makes the solicitation prone to regulation, but the mode of 
communication in which the solicitation is sent that makes the solicitation 
prone to regulation.164  The mode of communication is a fundamental factor 
in determining whether direct solicitation is overreaching or cause for undue 
influence.165 
Compared to print advertising, targeted direct mail solicitation 
“‘poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence’ than does in-
person solicitation.”166  The Court held that written communications, either 
targeted or made toward the general public do not “involve[] ‘the coercive 
force of the personal presence of a trained advocate’ or the ‘pressure on the 
potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of 
representation.’”167  People receiving a written communication has the ability 
to draw their attention either towards or away from the solicitation.168  A 
targeted letter also does not have the ability to invade the privacy of a 
recipient any more than an attorney solicitation directed to the public at large 
can invade on a recipient’s privacy.169  The Court ultimately held that “a 
truthful and non-deceptive letter, no matter how big its type and how much it 
																																																								
161. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76; see also Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 449, 467–68. 
162. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 474–75. 
163. Id. at 474. 
164. See id. at 475. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985)). 
167. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 (quoting Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642). 
168. Id. at 475–76. 
169. Id. at 476. 
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speculates, can never shout at the recipient or grasp him by the lapels, . . . as 
can a lawyer engaging in face-to-face solicitation.” 170   Because attorney 
advertisements are commercial speech and thus, protected under the First 
Amendment, a state may not raise a substantial interest in restricting truthful 
and non-deceptive lawyer solicitations, including targeted direct mail 
solicitations.171 
IV. FLORIDA’S REGULATIONS ON ATTORNEY ADVERTISEMENTS 
A. Recognizing Commercial Speech Protection in Florida 
The State of Florida has long been known for its strict standards in 
regulating attorney advertisements. 172   Florida first recognized attorney 
advertisements as commercial speech and protected under the First 
Amendment in the year 1989. 173   Following the precedents set by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, the 
Florida Bar took the initiative of conducting a survey of the public opinion 
on attorney advertising, and “[a]fter conducting hearings, . . . surveys, and 
reviewing extensive public commentary, the [Florida] Bar determined that 
several changes to its advertising rules were in order.”174  As a result of these 
findings, “[i]n late 1990 the [Supreme Court of Florida] adopted the [Florida] 
Bar’s proposed amendments with some modifications.”175   The Supreme 
Court of Florida took the initiative to pass the amended rules to attorney 
advertisements because of the precedents set by the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy and Bates. 176   The 
Supreme Court of Florida cited Bates stating that the Supreme Court upheld 
“‘reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising.’”177  
The Supreme Court of Florida explained “[s]ince lawyers render professional 
																																																								
170. Id. at 479 (citation omitted). 
171. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
172. Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky & Tera Jckowski Peterson, Medium-Specific 
Regulation of Attorney Advertising: A Critique, 18 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 259, 260 (2007). 
173. Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 620 (1995); Fla. Bar:  Petition 
to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 455 (Fla. 1990); 
see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
174. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. 
Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976). 
175. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 620; see also Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend 
the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452. 
176. Fla.  Bar: Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. 
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 456–57; see also Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977); 
Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 770. 
177. Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. 
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 458 (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384). 
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services [that] vary from attorney to attorney, case to case, and client to 
client, the potential for deception . . . in advertising is great.” 178   The 
amended rules to attorney advertisements in Florida supported “reasonable 
restrictions on the time, place, and manner of advertising” and reduced 
deception of potential clients caused by advertisements.179  These amended 
Florida Bar Rules were the first amendments to the Florida Bar Rules 
subsequent to the Supreme Court decisions of Virginia State Board of 
Pharmacy and Bates, upholding commercial speech as protected under the 
First Amendment and extending this protection to attorney advertisements.180  
Maintaining its strict regulations on attorney advertisements, Florida has 
proceeded to “push[] the First Amendment envelope that safeguards the right 
of attorneys to inform potential clients about the [legal] services they 
offer.”181 
The Florida Bar, even after the Supreme Court of Florida passed the 
amended rules allowing Florida to be a more permissive state towards 
attorney advertisement, continued to reveal its beliefs about the negative 
effects that attorney advertisements place on the legal profession.182  In 1994, 
after the attorney advertising rules were recently amended to allow attorney 
advertisements, former Florida Bar President, Patricia A. Seitz, expressed to 
the ABA that “‘[a]ggressive ads have caused the public to see the legal 
system as a lottery of fictitious claims in which lawyers make out like 
bandits in fees.’” 183   Patricia A. Seitz also expressed that attorney 
advertisements were to blame for “‘increas[ing] the public’s cynicism about 
the legal system, which undermines the system that lawyers take an oath to 
uphold.’”184  In the year 2000, as advertisements became more popular and 
used amongst attorneys, the Florida Bar decided that it was time to take a 
stronger stance against attorneys who violated any Florida rules regarding 
attorney advertisements.185  The Florida Bar subsequently passed a motion to 
																																																								
178. Id. 
179. Id. (quoting Bates, 433 U.S. at 384). 
180. Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. 
Issues, 571 So. 2d at 457–58; see also Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 
U.S. at 770. 
181. Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 261. 
182. See Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—
Advert. Issues, 571 So. 2d at 452, 455; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260 n.1. 
183. James Podgers, Image Problem: Burned by a Fall in Public Favor, the 
Organized Bar Turns Up the Heat on Lawyer Advertising, A.B.A. J., Feb. 1994, at 66, 68; see 
also Fla. Bar:  Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Advert. Issues, 571 So. 
2d at 452, 455. 
184. Podgers, supra note 183, at 68. 
185. Gary Blankenship, Bar to Take a Harder Line Toward Lawyer Ad 
Violations, FLA. B. NEWS, July 1, 2000, at 13. 
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initiate grievances against any Florida Bar attorney who violated the Bar 
rules in regard to attorney advertisements.186  The Bar’s motive for initiating 
grievances against violators of the Florida Bar rules of attorney 
advertisements was due to appeals.187  The Bar was frustrated that since 
advertisement appeals take several months, attorneys may still run their 
advertisements, and by the time the appeal has been decided, the 
advertisement could have already been exposed through various media and 
communications.188 
The Florida Bar maintained its strong grip on regulating attorney 
advertisements in 2004, when it was announced that the Florida Bar was 
forming an Advertising Task Force. 189   The purpose of creating the 
Advertising Task Force was to review Florida’s attorney advertisement 
regulations and determine when changes or amendments to the rules would 
be necessary.190  The Florida Bar President at the time, Kelly Overstreet 
Johnson, expressed that “many lawyers still dislike or oppose lawyer 
advertising, believing [it is] the [strongest] cause of public discontent with 
the profession.”191  Johnson also explained that because Supreme Court of 
the United States precedent prohibits complete bans on attorney 
advertisements, it is important to make sure that the Florida Bar’s rules 
remain “as consistent . . . as possible and enforced.”192 
In 2013, the Florida Bar petitioned to the Supreme Court of Florida 
to consider proposed amendments to Subchapter 4-7 of the Rules Regulating 
the Florida Bar. 193   The Florida Bar proposed to the Supreme Court of 
Florida that they strike all current rules regarding attorney advertisements 
and adopt entirely new rules, which ultimately the Supreme Court of Florida 
adopted. 194   The adoption of entirely new rules regarding attorney 
advertisements was due to a “contemporary study of lawyer advertising, 
which . . . include[d] public evaluation and comments about lawyer 
advertising.”195  After analyzing the findings, the Florida Bar came to the 
																																																								
186. Id. 
187. See id. 
188. Id. 
189. See New Bar Panel to Review Attorney Advertising Rules, FLA. B. NEWS, 
Dec. 15, 2003, at 1. 
190. Id. 
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7, 
Lawyer Advert. Rules, 108 So. 3d 609, 609 (Fla. 2013); see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT r. 4-7.11 (2014). 
194. In re Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar—Subchapter 4-7, 
108 So. 3d at 609, 611. 
195. Id. at 609–10. 
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conclusion that entirely new rules, which prevent the “dissemination of 
misleading and unduly manipulative information,” should be adopted. 196  
The new advertising rules were “designed to make the advertising rules more 
cohesive, easier for lawyers who advertise to understand, and less 
cumbersome for the [Florida] Bar to apply and enforce.”197 
B. Distinguishing Standards of the Florida Bar and the American Bar 
Association 
Florida is a state that has modeled its ethical and professional rules 
of conduct after the ABA Model Rules.198  Florida’s Rules of Professional 
Conduct regarding attorney advertisements and solicitations are found in 
Rule 4-7.18, which reads: 
Except as provided in subdivision (b) of this rule, a lawyer may 
not:  (1) solicit, or permit employees or agents of the lawyer to 
solicit on the lawyer’s behalf, professional employment from a 
prospective client with whom the lawyer has no family or prior 
professional relationship, in person or otherwise, when a 
significant motive for the lawyer’s doing so is the lawyer’s 
pecuniary gain.  The term solicit includes contact in person, by 
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or by other communication 
directed to a specific recipient and includes any written form of 
communication, including any electronic mail communication, 
directed to a specific recipient and not meeting the requirements of 
subdivision (b) of this rule and rules 4-7.11 through 4-7.17 of these 
rules; [and] (2) enter into an agreement for, charge, or collect a fee 
for professional employment obtained in violation of this rule.199 
The Florida Bar Standing Committee on Advertising’s Handbook on 
Lawyer Advertising and Solicitation also contains regulations that lawyers in 
the State of Florida must comply with, in addition to the Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct. 200   The Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and 
Solicitation cites Rule 4-7.11(a) of the Florida Rules of Professional 
Conduct:  “Florida’s lawyer advertising rules apply to all forms of 
communication seeking legal employment in any print or electronic forum, 
including but not limited to newspapers, magazines, brochures, flyers, 
television, radio, direct mail, electronic mail, and Internet, including banners, 
																																																								
196. Id. at 610. 
197. Id. 
198. See About the Model Rules, supra note 85. 
199. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(a) (2014). 
200. See FLA. BAR STANDING COMM. ON ADVERTISING, HANDBOOK ON LAWYER 
ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION 1 (10th ed. 2013, rev. 2014). 
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pop-ups, websites, social networking, and video sharing media.”201  In regard 
to Rule 4-7.18 of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct and prohibited 
forms of attorney solicitation, the Handbook on Lawyer Advertising and 
Solicitation states: 
A lawyer may not contact a prospective client in person, by 
telephone, telegraph, or facsimile, or through other means of direct 
contact, unless the prospective client is a family member, current 
client, or former client.  This prohibition does not extend to 
unsolicited direct mail or email communications made in 
compliance with Rule 4-7.18(b).202 
Attorneys who advertise through direct mail and email 
communications must not use “‘coercion, duress, fraud, overreaching, 
harassment, intimidation, or undue influence’” in order to obtain clientele.203  
According to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, a lawyer is not 
permitted to send potential clients advertisements through direct mail or 
email communications if the lawyer has been informed that the potential 
client does not wish to receive the communications from the lawyer.204 
On a national perspective, Rule 7.2 and Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model 
Rules set the standards for attorney advertisements and solicitations.205  In 
contrast to the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct that specifically list the 
modes of communications in which a lawyer may not advertise to a potential 
client, Rule 7.2 of the ABA Model Rules states that “a lawyer may advertise 
services through written, recorded or electronic communication, including 
public media.”206  Some of the communications in which Florida prohibits 
lawyers from advertising through are permitted by the ABA Model Rules.207  
For example, it can be argued that telephone communications classify as 
electronic communications and are thus permissible under the ABA Model 
Rules, but not permissible under the Florida Rules of Professional 
																																																								
201. Id. at 2. 
202. Id. at 4. 
203. HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, 
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014). 
204. HANDBOOK ON LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, 
at 19; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18(b) (2014). 
205. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2, 7.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2013); see 
also supra Section II.C. 
206. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a)–(b) (2014); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a) (2013). 
207. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11 (2014); MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2 (2013). 
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Conduct. 208   Rule 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules specifically discusses 
solicitation of clients by attorneys and distinguishes that a lawyer may not 
solicit through any live or real-time communications; whereas the Florida 
Rules of Professional Conduct define solicit as in-person communications.209 
V. EXTENDING FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION TO ATTORNEY 
ADVERTISEMENTS VIA TEXT MESSAGES 
A. Classifying Attorney Advertisements Via Text Messages as Protected 
Commercial Speech 
A Florida law firm has recently challenged the Florida Bar for 
denying the law firm’s proposal of sending automated text messages to 
potential clients advertising the firm’s legal services.210  The Florida Bar 
classified automated text messages to potential clients as direct solicitation 
by telephone prohibited by the Florida Advertising Rules and Florida Rules 
of Professional Conduct.211  The law firm has argued that text messages may 
be classified as direct mail or email, which are permitted by the Florida 
Advertising Rules and the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.212  Based 
on the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States in regards to 
direct and indirect attorney advertisements, text messages more closely 
resemble the indirect communications in Shapero than the direct solicitation 
analyzed in Ohralik.213 
When analyzing attorney advertisements through the use of text 
messages, direct text messages to potential clients by attorneys reflect the 
same communications that the Supreme Court of the United States analyzed 
in Shapero.214  Similar to the issue in the case of the Florida law firm sending 
direct text messages to potential clients, the Supreme Court of the United 
States was left with the question of whether a state may prohibit direct letters 
to targeted potential clients in Shapero. 215   As the Court pointed out in 
																																																								
208. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.11(a) (2014); MODEL RULES 
OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.2(a) (2013). 
209. See FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); MODEL 
RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3(a) (2013). 
210. Hale, supra note 15. 
211. FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4–7.18(a)(1) (2014); HANDBOOK ON 
LAWYER ADVERTISING AND SOLICITATION, supra note 200, at 4; Hale, supra note 15. 
212. Hale, supra note 15; see also FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18 
(2014). 
213. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 479 (1988); Ohralik v. Ohio 
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978). 
214. See Shapero, 486 U.S. at 479. 
215. Id. at 468; Hale, supra note 15. 
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Shapero, a recipient of written communications has the ability to read the 
communication or avert their attention away from the communication.216  
Text messages, like letters, have the ability to be read, ignored and looked at 
later, or if the recipient chooses, not even seen at all.217  In this respect, text 
messages are similar to written communications, such as emails or letters.218 
In the context of direct solicitation, text messages do not reflect the 
same in-person solicitation that the Court analyzed in Ohralik.219  In-person 
solicitation, or live communications such as soliciting through the telephone, 
are distinguished from text messages in that text messages do not have the 
same high risk of intimidation or undue influence that live or in-person 
solicitation may have.220  Recipients of text messages are not pressured to 
accept legal representation immediately and are not pressured by the 
presence of an attorney.221  Advertisements sent via text message also allow 
the recipient to reflect on the message, compare the nature and availability of 
goods and services, and allow for rational decision-making.222  Unlike direct 
in-person solicitations, text messages are not immediate communications that 
urge an immediate response.223  Attorney advertisements via text message 
are classified as commercial speech and are thus deserving of First 
Amendment protection because they are direct communications that propose 
a transaction and serve the public interest of informing the public of the 
availability, nature, and prices of services.224 
																																																								
216. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475–76 (“A letter, like a printed advertisement—but 
unlike a lawyer—can readily be put in a drawer to be considered later, ignored, or 
discarded.”). 
217. See id. 
218. See id.; Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of 
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985). 
219. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475; see also Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 
U.S. 447, 457 (1978). 
220. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457. 
221. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“Print advertising may convey information and 
ideas more or less effectively, but in most cases, it will lack the coercive force of the personal 
presence of a trained advocate.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 465 (“[T]he potential for overreaching 
is significantly greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, 
personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person.”). 
222. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 457; Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 
(1977) (holding that “commercial speech . . . inform[s] the public of the availability, nature, 
and prices of products and services, and . . . serves individual and societal interests in assuring 
informed and reliable decision-making.”). 
223. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (“In addition, a printed advertisement, unlike a 
personal encounter initiated by an attorney, is not likely to involve pressure on the potential 
client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of representation.”); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 
457 (“The aim and effect of in-person solicitation may be to provide a one-sided presentation 
and to encourage speedy and perhaps uninformed decision-making.”). 
224. Bates, 433 U.S. at 364; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
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B. Text Messages Applied to the Central Hudson test 
If attorney advertisements via text messages are classified as 
commercial speech, in order to determine whether such commercial speech 
may be restricted or prohibited by a state, the Central Hudson test must be 
applied.225  The first prong of the four-part analysis asks whether the speech 
is protected under the First Amendment. 226   Bates extended commercial 
speech protection to attorney advertisements, allowing attorney 
advertisements to be considered protected First Amendment speech. 227  
Attorney advertisements via text messages propose a transaction and inform 
the public of the availability of goods and services, qualifying as commercial 
speech. 228   Attorney advertisements via text messages, which do not 
advertise unlawful activity and are not misleading or deceptive, meet the 
conditions for First Amendment protection.229 
The second part of the Central Hudson test requires that the asserted 
governmental interest be substantial.230  In regard to the Florida Bar denying 
a Florida law firm’s proposal to send automated text messages to potential 
clients, the Florida Bar can argue that its asserted interest in restricting the 
automated text messages would be to protect Florida citizens in need of legal 
services.231  As the Court found in the case of Ohralik, a state has reason to 
assume that in-person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney may be 
harmful to the person who is solicited.232  However, text messages, like other 
written communications, do not have the ability to intimidate or cause undue 
influence like other forms of in-person solicitation. 233   Attorney 
advertisements also serve the important function of informing consumers of 
goods, which is fundamental to the freedom of speech of both attorneys and 
consumers.234  This asserted state interest of protecting consumers in Florida 
would fail in the case of attorney advertisements via text messages.235  The 
																																																								
225. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 
U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
226. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
227. Bates, 433 U.S. at 384; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
228. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 638; Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455–56. 
229. Bates, 433 U.S. at 383; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
230. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566, 568–69. 
231. See Hale, supra note 15. 
232. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466. 
233. See Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642 (holding that print advertisements generally 
pose a much less risk of overreaching or undue influence than in-person solicitation). 
234. See U.S. CONST. amend. I; Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; Bates, 433 U.S. at 
364. 
235. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466 (holding the State has reason to assume in-
person solicitation of potential clients by an attorney will be injurious to the person who is 
solicited). 
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Florida Bar may also argue that direct solicitation should be prohibited in 
order to maintain the nobleness of the legal profession.236  As the Court held 
in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, a state interest in upholding 
professionalism of a field may not be a sufficient interest in restricting 
commercial speech.237  The asserted state interest in upholding the dignity of 
the legal profession would also fail under the Central Hudson test in 
analyzing attorney advertisements via text messages to potential clients.238 
If the asserted state interests were determined to be substantial, it 
must then be determined whether the restrictions directly advance the 
asserted state interest.239  If the Florida Bar were to assert the interests of 
protecting consumers or upholding the legal profession, then restricting text 
messages by attorneys to potential clients would have to carry out these 
interests. 240   The restrictions also may not be more extensive than is 
necessary to serve that interest.241  If the Florida Bar were able to carry out 
its asserted interests without restricting or prohibiting attorney 
advertisements via text messages, then the restriction or prohibition of the 
commercial speech would violate the First Amendment.242 
C. Keeping up with Modern Modes of Communication 
In the year 2000, the Florida Bar noted that a “member of the Florida 
Bar might feel lost without a cell phone.”243  Fifteen years later, that opinion 
should not have changed considering that technology has only grown more 
popular and become more useful.244  The opinion of the Florida Bar in 2000 
was that technology must be “utilize[d] . . . to become more efficient and [to] 
provide the public with a better justice system.”245  At the time, technology 
was seen as “giving the decision-maker more information to make . . . 
																																																								
236. See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 
425 U.S. 748, 766 (1976). 
237. See id. at 766, 770. 
238. Id. at 766 (holding an asserted state interest in upholding professionalism 
of a field may not be sufficient); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980). 
239. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566. 
240. See id. 
241. See id. 
242. See id. (holding that a state’s asserted interest in restricting commercial 
speech must be narrowly drawn and may not be more extensive than is necessary to serve that 
interest). 
243. Gary Blankenship, The Florida Bar:  Changing Through Technology, 
FLA. B. J., Apr. 2000, at 37, 37. 
244. See Hale, supra note 15. 
245. Blankenship, supra note 243, at 39–40. 
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decision[s].”246  Relating to commercial speech, attorneys who choose to 
advertise must ensure that their advertisements are able to keep up with 
evolving technology in order to provide consumers with the knowledge of 
the nature and availability of goods and services.247  If in the year 2000, the 
Florida Bar was noting how extensive the use of cell phones were, this 
number has only expanded, and attorneys today must also utilize these 
communications.248 
In 2000, evolving technology was already a major concern for the 
practice of law, as stated, “[t]echnology—and how lawyers use it—will be an 
important factor in determining what the practice of law looks like in the 
next [ten] years, let alone the next [fifty].”249  It is important for lawyers to 
recognize where the profession is headed and be able to keep up with the 
profession.250  Society and technology is something that is constantly and 
rapidly changing that lawyers, along with state bar associations, must be able 
to recognize. 251   Rules regarding commercial speech and attorney 
advertisements should also be flexible and able to keep up with society and 
technology.252  It will be “[t]he lawyers who are able to stay on top of 
changing times [that will be] the ones who are going to be successful.”253  
There will be even more expansive growth and changes in technology, and it 
is essential that the legal profession, including commercial speech and 
attorney advertisements, be able to keep up with these changes.254 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Throughout the history of the legal profession, advertising by 
attorneys has consistently been looked down upon and considered 
unprofessional. 255   These consistent negative views of attorney 
advertisements have influenced the ethical and professional standards of the 
																																																								
246. Id. at 40. 
247. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (“And commercial 
speech serves to inform the public of the availability, nature, and prices of products and 
services, and thus performs an indispensible role in the allocation of resources in a free 
enterprise system.”). 
248. See Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40; Hale, supra note 15. 
249. Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40. 
250. Id. 
251. See id. 
252. Id.; DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212. 
253. Blankenship, supra note 243, at 40. 
254. See id. 
255. See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra 
Part I. 
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ABA, as well as a majority of state bar ethical and professional standards.256  
It was not until 1977 in the case of Bates, where the Supreme Court of the 
United States determined attorney advertisements to be commercial speech 
and thus protected under the First Amendment, that the ABA standards and 
state bar ethical and professional rules began to permit attorneys to freely 
advertise their legal services and fees.257  Even after the Court extended First 
Amendment protections to attorney advertisements, ethical and professional 
rules have still maintained strict standards and regulations on attorney 
advertisements.258  These strict regulations consist of the delicate balance 
between maintaining the honor and dignity of the legal profession and 
upholding the First Amendment rights of attorneys to freely advertise their 
legal services and fees.259  Florida is a state that has consistently placed some 
of the strictest regulations on attorney advertisements.260 
Attorney advertisements that directly solicit potential clients are a 
great concern for the ABA, as well as state bar associations, including the 
Florida Bar.261  One of the modes of communication that is currently at issue 
in the State of Florida, is targeted automated text messages to potential 
clients. 262   The Florida Bar has struck down a firm’s proposed plan of 
sending automated text messages to potential clients, as direct solicitation via 
telephone in violation of the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct.263  Upon 
a closer analysis of the use of text messages by attorneys to potential clients, 
these communications more closely resemble the direct solicitation that was 
held to be constitutionally protected commercial speech in Zauderer and 
Shapero. 264   Text messages sustain the fundamental public interest of 
informing consumers of the nature, availability, and prices of available 
services and promote rational decision-making by the consumer.265 
In conclusion, the Florida Bar should allow attorney advertisements 
via text messages because these communications are considered protected 
																																																								
256. See DRINKER, supra note 1, at 212; Brace, supra note 3, at 110–11; supra 
Section I.C. 
257. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 379 (1977); Brace, supra note 3, 
at 111, 113; Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 263–64, 272–73. 
258. Bates, 433 U.S. at 379; see also U.S. CONST. amend. I; MODEL RULES OF 
PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.1–.3 (2013). 
259. See supra Part I. 
260. Lidsky & Peterson, supra note 172, at 260–61; see also supra Part IV. 
261. See supra Section III.B. 
262. See supra Parts I, V. 
263. See supra Part I. 
264. See Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466, 475–76, 478 (1988); 
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 641–42 
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forms of commercial speech under the First Amendment.266  Text messages 
do not invade the privacy of the recipient, nor demand an immediate 
response, proving to not violate the ABA Model Rules or Florida Rules of 
Professional Conduct.267  Florida must also consider allowing attorneys to 
advertise legal services through targeted text messages in order to keep up 
with evolving modern communications.268 
266. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see also supra Part V. 
267. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 7.3, 7.3 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 
2013); FLA. RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 4-7.18 (2014); see also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 642; 
supra Part V. 
268. See supra Section V.C. 
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